Abstract Jensen and Meckling (1992) hypothesize that the finn's decentralization decision is determined by a tradeoff of knowledge transfer costs and control (agency) costs. To maximize value, either knowledge must be transferred to those with the right to make decisions or decision rights must be transferred to those who have the knowledge. We identify characteristics of firms' investment opportunity sets that affect knowledge transfer and control costs and generate testable predictions about the relations between these characteristics and firms' decentralization decisions. The evidence we present is generally consistent with our predictions and is robust to different ways of measuring variables.
Introduction
This paper provides evidence on the empirical relations between the decentralization of decision rights within the firm and observable characteristics of the firm's investment opportunity set. Decentralization within the firm is complex, involving delegation of some decision rights and not others from one managerial level to another, and the splitting of decision rights for a particular proposal among different individuals (Meckling and Jensen, 1986 ). This complexity makes modeling decentralization difficult and the extant formal and informal models are necessarily relatively simple. I Simplicity is a virtue if the model captures the essence of decentralization and is descriptive. Knowledge of systematic empirical associations between decentralization and firm attributes contributes to selecting among existing models and building more descriptive models.
We use existing models to select variables representing decentralization of decision rights and firm attributes expected to be associated with decision rights. The level of delegation investigated is from the CEO to the next management level below the CEO.2 In this version of the paper, the organization of that level into profit and cost centers is used to represent decentralization. Future versions will also use delegation of the investment decision and the ability to substitute across budget line items to measure decentralization both individually and in combination. The three decentralization variables are obtained from firms' responses to a questionnaire.
The finn characteristics used in empirical work are the type of knowledge in the firm's industry, interdependence of the finn's investments, regulation and finn size. Measures of these finn attribute variables are initially obtained from questionnaire responses and public data sources.
We find that the use of profit and cost centers is robustly related to characteristics of the finn's investment opportunity set. Larger firms with more specialized knowledge, less dependent investments and no regulation are more likely to decentralize decision rights by using profit centers.
That result is essentially invariant to the alternative specifications of the finn attribute variables that are employed. One specification uses questionnaire data only for the dependent variable and so can be used to predict decentralization for firms outside the sample.
I For examples of both formal and informal decentralization models see: Chandler (1962 and 1977) : Williamson (1975) : Simon (1976) : Vancil (1978) ; Vaysman (1991) ; Melamud, Mookerjee and Re 'ielstein (1992) : Jensen and Meckling (1992) : Milgrom and Roberts (1992); and Raduer (1992) 2The term CEO (or CEO's office) refers to all components of the executive office. including the board of directors, chairman. president and any executive vice-presidents.
To gain further insight into the empirical model's descriptive ability, the specification that uses only non-questionnaire independent variables is employed to predict the extent of decentralization in a sample corporation whose decentralization has also been assessed in the . . business media in the period 1990 to 1993 . In future versions we will search for more in-and out-of sample corporations whose decentralization is assessed in the media to use to assess the model.
The next section (section 2) discusses the measures of decentralization. Section 3 develops the knowledge type characteristic of the finn's investment opportunity set, its expected relations to decentralization and empirical measures. The interdependence of investments, regulation, and firms size characteristics are discussed in section 4 and measures developed. Descriptive statistics are provided in section 5 and section 6 presents the empirical relations between the decentralization measure and investment characteristics. Section 7 presents the Caterpillar case. A summary and conclusion appear in the final section.
Decentralization
As noted above, the allocation of decision rights within the firm is complex. Some rights are kept by the CEO's executive office and others are delegated to the next level. Also, single decisions can be broken into different parts with the executive office handl ing some parts and the next level others. For example, investment decisions are often split into initiation, notification, ratification, implementation and monitoring tasks (see Meckling and Jensen, 1986) . The lower level is given the right to initiate an investment project, but the executive office keeps the right to ratify the investment decision. The particular combination of decentralized and centralized decision rights or parts of decision rights chosen depends on the costs and benefits of the different combinations.
Because some decision rights are centralized and others decentralized and decision rights are broken up, it is difficu It to assess the overall degree of decentralization from the CEO to the next management level ("second level"). In this version of the paper, we use an instrumental variable for the general degree of decentralization, namely the relative use of profit and cost centers at the second level. According to Williamson (1975) , Vancil (1978) and Meckling and Jensen (1986) profit-center managers typically have a broader set of decision rights than cost-center managers;
profit centers are associated with more decentralization. In future versions of the paper, we will investigate the second level management's rights to initiate investment decisions and to substitute across budget line items.
The decentralization measures are obtained from a questionnaire (see appendix A). The questionnaire asks the firm management to identify the second level and tell us whether the second level units are profit centers, cost centers or a mixture of the two. To avoid firms using different interpretations of the second level, we define in the questionnaire what we mean by the second level. The focus is on line units and so excludes functions such as finance and treasury.
. .
Knowledge Type Characteristics and Decentralization
The literature on decentralization (Chandler, 1962 and 1977; Jensen and Meckling, 1992; Vancil, 1978; and Williamson, 1975) identifies several investment opportunity set characteristics that are likely to be associated with decentralization of the firm. Those characteristics are the type of knowledge involved in the firm's investments, the dependence among the firm's investments, the size of the firm's investments and whether or not the investments are regulated. The knowledge type, dependence and regulation characteristics are predetermined for the purposes of our analysis.
The size characteristic is endogenous, but in the absence of a model explaining size we are forced to treat it as predetermined.
The characteristics are not independent. For example, whether or not an industry is regulated is related to the type of the knowledge generated within the industry. But, as we shall see, once an industry is regulated, regulation, per se, provides an incentive to centralize. Further, some characteristics are related to both the costs and benefits of decentralization so that the cross sectional empirical relation we estimate is a reduced form and it is difficult to interpret the characteristics' coefficients. Still, the existence of a cross-sectional relation between decentralization and the characteristics identified by theory provides some reassurance about the theory's relevance. In this section we explain why knowledge type attributes are expected to be related to decentralization and how we measure it.
Knowledge type
Organizations are more likely to survive if those with the responsibility for decisions also have the knowledge valuable to those decisions (Hayek, 1945; Harris, Kriebel and Raviv, 1982; and Jensen and Meckling, 1992) . Collocation of decision rights with knowledge can be achieved by transferring the knowledge to the person who has the decision rights or by transferring the decision rights to the person with the knowledge. While the CEO has knowledge that lower levels do not, much of the literature assumes that knowledge is generated at the lower level. We also adopt that assumption so that transfer of knowledge is centralization and transfer of decision rights is decentralization. Both centralization and decentralization involve costs as well as benefits.
Which (or how much of each) is optimal depends on the relative costs of transferring knowledge and transferring decision rights.
In part, knowledge transfer costs arise because decision-makers have limited mental and sensory faculties (see March and Simon, 1958, or Arrow, 1974) . Effective use of knowledge in decisions requires a decision maker to understand the knowledge received. As Jensen and Meckling (1992, p. 4) put it, "Transfer ... means effective transfer not merely communication."
Part of knowledge transfer costs is the residual loss that occurs because the decision-maker does not understand the knowledge well enough to act on it in a timely manner. Transfer costs also include out of pocket costs of transmitting the knowledge to the person with the decision rights and residual losses that arise from delays in this transmission process. Decentralization reduces knowledge transfer costs.'
The costs of transferring decision rights from the CEO to a lower level are control costs. In non-owner-managed firms, the labor, corporate control, capital and product markets provide the CEO with an incentive to act in the owners' interests. However, there is still some control cost in the form of residual loss in value because the CEO's incentives are not perfectly aligned with the owners' interests. Transferring decision rights from the CEO to lower-level managers increases control costs. Having lower-level managers make decisions in the owners' (or even the CEO's)
interests requires costly systems for measuring and evaluating the lower-level manager's performance and rewarding or punishing their performance. Residual loss increases also if those systems do not perfectly align the lower-level manager's interests with those of the owners'.
Decentralization increases control costs.
Organization of the firm depends on the relative magnitudes of knowledge transfer and control costs. Decision rights tend to remain in the CEO's office when the cost of transferring knowledge to the CEO is low, or when control costs are large relative to knowledge transfer costs.
Decision rights tend to be delegated to lower levels of the firm when the finn primarily produces knowledge that is costly to transfer to the CEO or when control costs are relatively low.
3papers by Melumad, Mookherjee and Reichelstein (1992) (MMR) and Vaysman (1991) examine delegated decision making when communication between the CEO and other parts of the organization is re~'<cted. MMR examine demand for responsibility (profit and cost) centers, and Vaysrnan examines .ie. and for cost-based transfer prices when communication is limited. These papers refer to the benefit from delegating decision rights as the flexibility gain. In our terminology flexibility gain is a reduction in knowledge transfer costs.
We adopt Demsetz' (1988) term "specialized" to refer to knowledge that is costly to transfer and "non-specialized" to refer to knowledge that can be transferred at low cost.f We argue below that flows of knowledge (information) are only useful in the context of the existing stock and so use the term knowledge to refer to both stocks and flows of knowledge. Information refers just to flows.
Degree of specialization of knowledge affects both knowledge transfer costs and control costs. By definition, knowledge transfer costs are high when knowledge is specialized Also by definition, specialized knowledge is unobservable by the CEO. This additional "noise" makes it harder to separate the manager's ability and effort from the effects of the state variable. It is more difficult for the CEO's office to assess unit managers' decisions that are based on specialized knowledge. Hence, the costs of controlling unit managers are higher for firms that generate more specialized knowledge. This reduces the tendency for firms generating relatively more specialized knowledge to be more decentralized. We therefore conduct two tail tests on degree of specialization of knowledge.
To estimate whether knowledge in an industry is specialized we identify six factors that we argue are related to transfer costs: ability to automate decisions that use the knowledge; ability to aggregate the knowledge; the level of technology and the extent of change in technology in the industry; level of competition in the industry; the demand for product heterogeneity in the industry;
and the amount of uncertainty in the industry. Those factors are attributes of knowledge in the industry or attributes of the industry's market. Based on the first five of those factors we classify industries defined by two-digit SIC codes. That classification is used to generate two knowledge type measures. The sixth factor, uncertainty, is used to generate a third knowledge type measure.
The classification of industries and the resultant information type measures are subjective, but the classification is made "a priori." To test the robustness of our classification, in future versions we will have outsiders who do not know the objective of the research classify the industries using the five factors. We also will attempt to generate objective measures of some of those five factors. In this version, we estimate the relation between decentralization and investment 4 Demsetz' (1988) interest is in how specialized knowledge helps to determine the boundaries of the firm rather than in how decision rights are allocated within the firm, but we interpret Demsetz' term specialized to be knowledge that is costly to transfer. Demsetz does not discuss other types of knowledge. Kaplan and Atkinson (1989) discuss knowledge transfer costs and control costs and also use the term specialized to describe knowledge that is costly to transfer. Because knowledge that is specific to time ar olace is costly to transfer, Jensen and Meckling (1992) adopt the term specific to refer to knowledge .h: rs costly to transfer and use the term general to describe knowledge that is not costly to transfer. Since the term specific is used to refer to assets or human capital that lose value if not used in the firm, we use Demsetz' term specialized.
Decentralization of the Finn: Theory and Evidence set characteristics using all three knowledge type measures and using the objective uncertainty measure only.
3.2. Factors related to knowledge type a) Ability to automate decision making. Assembled knowledge is produced by assembling and analyzing knowledge of particular circumstances and is important to the existence and organization of firms (Jensen and Meckling, 1992) . Assembled knowledge can be either specialized or non-specialized. When knowledge is assembled as the result of experience it tends to be specialized. A lathe operator develops knowledge over time about operating characteristics of the machine that are difficult to communicate to others. An arbitrageur develops intuition and judgment that are costly to communicate to someone who does not continually observe information flow and the evolution of prices. Inability to automate the decision making process is the crucial ingredient in these examples that makes the assembled knowledge specialized. If decisions can be automated, then the knowledge on which they are based is non-specialized.
On the surface, improvements in computer systems seem to provide the ability to move more knowledge up to decision makers at lower costs. However, a finn's ability to do this is limited by humans' ability to comprehend the data transferred. Automation of decisions requires more than just moving the data observed by say the arbitrageur. Automation must also capture the skill and judgment the arbitrageur develops over time. Expert systems and neural networks are attempts to automate human skill and judgment that is costly to acquire. Since ability to automate decisions changes with technology, organizational form also changes with technology.
b) Ability to aggregate knowledge. When knowledge can be aggregated, it tends to be non-specialized. Further, since non-specialized knowledge can be created by aggregation, it is possible for transfer "costs" to be negative. There can be a net benefit. For example, it is difficult for the owner of one retail store to determine buying patterns or demand trends. Aggregating across related stores can filter out the noise so that trends can be estimated. There is an information externality among stores. Horizontal integration mitigates this externality problem and enables the assembly of cross-sectional knowledge through aggregation. 5 In a similar fashion, wholesalers learn about demand trends from the orders placed by independent retailers. In contrast to retail chains and wholesalers, which are an example of the assembly of cross-sectional 5 Aggregation of sales data and later dissemination of the aggregated data could be done by a service af" r t outside the firm. However, individual stores may be reluctant to release such knowledge to an agent :;~\ use it helps competitors or entrants and reduces the store's value. Horizontal integration may also reflect scale economies in purchasing and systems development or the value of establishing homogeneity in product quality.
knowledge, boutiques are attempts to capture the value of information about customer specific preferences.
On the surface it appears that insurance and financial services firms produce both aggregated (non-specialized) and specialized knowledge. Insurance companies produce knowledge on average mortality and accident rates, but they also produce knowledge on the accident rates of specific individuals. However, the knowledge about individuals is easily transferred and so does not meet the definition of specialized knowledge. Further, the essence of insurance is the pooling of risks based on assembled knowledge. One cannot simply hand someone a physics, chemistry, engineering or accounting book and have them be experts in these subjects. Even knowing the theory does not guarantee that someone can apply the knowledge to decisions. A famous example that is similar in spirit to those of the machine operator and arbitrageur is the expert pool (or billiards) player; see Friedman (1953, p. 22) . While the pool balls obey principles of physics, knowledge of the physical principles is insufficient to make an expert pool player.
In a finn with highly technical production processes that are changing rapidly and are fully understood only by people who work with them every day, the further someone rises in the finn the further they are removed from knowledge of the technology. A CEO who rises through the ranks will understand the technology better than a CEO brought in from another industry, but will still know less about the production than experts lower in the hierarchy.P At each higher level in the organization, technical knowledge is a subset of that at lower levels. Any finn with technical production processes tends to be of this type. Lathe operators and product design engineers develop knowledge over time that is difficult to convey to others. In contrast to products that vary across regions, consider a firm that produces shovels and forks for gardening. There are a limited number of shovel and fork types and most types are used in a wide variety of conditions. While snow shovels are only used in some regions, this knowledge is easily acquired and transferred. Shovel and fork production is not technologically complex.
Automobiles provide an example where a product is tailored to sub-groups of customers and the knowledge required to do this is costly to transfer. Shovel and fork production does not require detailed knowledge of individual customers or groups of customers, or that knowledge is easily tr~'l .ferred. Ceteris paribus, one should expect automobile firms to be more decentralized than shovel firms. We argue in section 3.1.1 that retail chains and wholesalers learn about demand trends from assembling data and that data is non-specialized. While it is possible for a salesperson to generate specialized knowledge about a customer's preferences, this is more likely to occur in "boutique"
operations where there is a high incidence of salesperson-specific repeat business. This is less likely with retail chains which are the type of retail firms in our sample. Exploitation of customer specific knowledge is a likely explanation for the existence of boutiques. Wholesale firms supplying retail firms can also assemble knowledge on demand trends. We also argue that insurance and financial firms produce primarily non-specialized knowledge at low levels in the firm. Therefore, we classify retail, wholesale, insurance, and finance firms as producing primarily non-specialized knowledge.
In section 3.1.1 we also argue that with modem communications, firms characterized by networks produce knowledge that is easily transferred and the firms gain from the aggregation and assembly of knowledge. Hence, we classify transport and utility firms as producing relatively less specialized and relatively more non-specialized knowledge.
7 Growth options are one manifestation of environmental change. In mature firms with few growth opportunities, demand and cost functions are likely to be well-known and stable. Knowledge of those functions can be transferred to top management at relatively low cost. In growth firms, however, information on demand and cost conditions is likely to be arriving more frequently (e.g. as new ill" ' .tments are made and as the demand for the new product is revealed) and be more time specific. If ::n ,:,ledge of the opportunities presented by growth options resides at the second level or lower in the organization, the existence of growth options (i.e. opportunities to invest at above the competitive rate of return) causes knowledge to be more specialized.
We expect firms with physical production processes, such as those in manufacturing, agriculture, mining and construction to generate relatively more specialized knowledge. There is less gain from assembly of knowledge in these industries relative to the technical knowledge that is costly to transfer. 8 We also expect these industries to have relatively more product heterogeneity and decisions that are harder to automate. Therefore, with two exceptions, we classify all primary production (agriculture, forestry, fishing and mining), construction and manufacturing industries as producing relatively more specialized knowledge. The exceptions are industries related to residential home construction. Large-scale builders of homes ("general building contractors" in table I) probably gain some assembled knowledge about consumer demand and so we classify that industry as "mixed". The "construction: special trade" industry in table 1 is involved in some residential home construction and so is also classified as "mixed."
Compared with other industry groupings, there is a great deal of variation within the service industries (SIC codes 7000 through 8999) that precludes categorizing the broad group as producing primarily specialized or non-specialized knowledge and so those industries are classified as " mixed." Security and commodity brokers can produce both non-specialized and specialized knowledge (arbitrage opportunities) and so are also classified as "mixed."
The knowledge type ( b) Incremental specialization from multiple lines of business. When the skills needed to run a particular business are costly to transmit, then firms that own more than one business will effectively produce specialized knowledge at the second level. This can cause the firm to decentralize, even when each line of business produces non-specialized knowledge. It is an empirical matter whether the degree of specialization of the knowledge produced within each of a firm's lines of business or the specialized knowledge needed to run given lines of business dominates organizational design at the second level.
For example, consider an insurance firm that writes say automobile, product liability, marine and general casualty, and life insurance. We argue that each of these insurance businesses generates primarily non-specialized knowledge, yet the knowledge required to manage each of these lines of business may be highly specialized.
8 A similar argument is made by Melumad, Mookherjee and Reichelstein (1992) .
Our knowledge type variable (KT) reflects the average degree of specialization within each of a firm's lines of business. We also have to measure the incremental effect on specialization of specialized knowledge required to run each line of business. We expect that this incremental effect increases with the number of lines of business the firm owns, and is largest for firms that produce primarily non-specialized knowledge within each line of business.
To First, we estimate the volatility of the rate of return on equity. Ideally we would unlever the equity volatility to calculate the underlying variance of the rate of return on the firm. Christie (1982, 1989) finds that the adjustment to unlever risky debt varies with leverage and that most of the cross-sectional variation in equity return variance is due to variation in firm return variance.
This suggests that using the unlevered variance instead of the equity return variance may increase measurement error rather than reduce it. Hence, we first estimate the volatility (UNC) of the firm's rate of return on equity over the sixty months up to and including December, 1987. 9 Second, to capture the uncertainty at the divisional level we adjust UNC by the correlations among the firm's lines of business. We call this variable DUNC for divisional uncertainty, and use it as the uncertainty variable in our regressions. The conversion from UNC to DUNC is to divide by SQRT{ I/NLOB + [(NLOB-I)/NLOB]*CORR}, where NLOB is the number of lines of 9 Uncertainty due to growth increases the variability of the cash flows of the firm and so is captured by this volatility estimate.
business (industries) the finn is in and CORR is the average off diagonal correlation among the finn's lines of business. 10 We generate these correlations using industry indices at both the two and three digit SIC level. Our results are not sensitive to the SIC level at which we make this adjustment. We predict DUNC has the same sign as KT and D.KT.
4.
Other Characteristics and Decentralization 4.1. Dependence.
If there are operating and information externalities among the components of a business, complete decentralization does not maximize finn value. Maximization of unit profits by each unit manager does not lead to maximization of finn profits. The vertical integration argument of Klein,
Crawford and Alchian (1978) is one example. We call these operating externalities dependencies.
They can take the form of dependent demand functions or joint supply or cost functions.
Dependence generates a demand for coordination of the actions of managers of the finn's units. The finn must induce lower level managers to consider the effects of their decisions on other parts of the finn. More dependent operations require greater coordination by top management and hence lead to larger control costs. In the absence of knowledge transfer costs, the coordination problem can be solved by centralization. In general, therefore, we expect firms with more dependent operations to be more centralized. Conversely, the Jess dependent the finn's operating units, the more decentralized we expect the finn to be.
Two other sources of dependencies are reputation and product and other tortious liabilities.
There are reputation externalities among the divisions of a firm. University administrations (CEOs) delegate decisions about research, course content and hiring untenured faculty to schools and departments, but retain a right of veto over promotion and tenure. Personnel functions are often consolidated at the corporate level to control liabilities associated with anti-discrimination laws. Product testing is often reviewed by corporate legal departments prior to new product introductions.
The operating dependence variable is obtained from the questionnaire, using a question developed by Rumelt (J 974) and used by Vancil (1978) . Question 8 of the questionnaire asks respondents to classify their finn as being a single business, having a dominant business, having related businesses or having unrelated businesses. The first classification (single business) suggests significant dependencies and is coded four and the last classification (unrelated businesses) suggests little dependence and is coded one. Dominant business and related businesses are coded three and two respectively.
The dependent variable (DEC) focuses on line units and so excludes corporate finance, treasury, personnel and legal functions. Therefore, we do not need to include cross-sectional differences in tort exposure in the measure of dependence. In section 6.2 we discuss an alternative measure of dependence that is independent of the questionnaire.
Size
As noted in section 3.1, humans have limited storage and processing capacity. Given that the potential amount of knowledge to be transferred to the CEO increases with finn size, the CEO's limited capacity means that the cost of transferring knowledge to the CEO increases with finn size.
Larger firms also have larger control costs, because the increased decentralization increases the cost of the CEO controlling the second level managers. We conduct a two-tailed test of the relation between decentralization and size. The only size variable reported is annual sales, since the results are not sensitive to the alternative size measures available. The sales data are obtained from
COMPUSTAT.ll
There is considerable size variation in the sample, but this may not be sufficient if there is a threshold effect with size. If size per se leads to decentralization of decision rights only after the finn reaches a given size, and if most of our firms are larger than this threshold, then continuous measures of size will not capture the important effect of size on decentralization. This also suggests that a dummy variable related to the threshold would be a better size measure than the continuous and categorical variables we use.
Regulation
The regulatory process can affect decentralization. Price regulation is primarily at the finn level and so encourages the firm to transfer knowledge to the top management for regulatory purposes. This reduces the cost of transferring knowledge for other purposes and so encourages regulated firms to be centralized.
There are two difficulties associated with regulation. First, regulation is applied to natural monopolies and so may be endogenous. If monopolies tend to centralize to capture the benefits of monopoly, then regulation is a result of the same factors causing centralization and should not be included as an exogenous variable affecting decentralization. Second, regulation can act as a proxy for other factors that determine decentralization of decision rights, knowledge type, uncertainty and dependence.
Regulated industries tend to be industries involving networks where there are gains from the aggregation of knowledge. Hence, regulation serves as a proxy for low knowledge transfer costs, and is likely to be associated with less decentralization. Also, regulatory bodies restrict top management's discretion, including discretion over the type of investments managers can make.
This tends to reduce uncertainty and the variance of regulated finus' cash flows (Smith and Watts, 1992 ). This effect is reinforced by utilities' monopoly position. Utilities do not face uncertainty created by the actions of direct competitors. Consequently, regulation is negatively related to uncertainty and is likely to be associated with less decentralization.
Finally, to the extent that regulators restrict firms to one industry, regulation also is positively related to dependence and again is likely to be associated with less decentralization.
Regulation, therefore, acts as a proxy for three other factors associated with less decentralization.
All three factor proxy relations suggest regulation is negatively associated with decentralization.
These proxy relations do not imply regulation, per se, affects decentralization.
The regulation variable (REG) is defined on an industry basis depending on the primary industry listed for a firm in Dun's Million Dollar Directory. If the primary industry is utility, transportation or communications, the firm is defined as being regulated and its regulatory variable is coded as one. All other firms have their REG variable coded as zero. Since utility, transportation and communications industries are among the industries defined as having low knowledge transfer costs, (see table I), the regulation variable is negatively correlated with knowledge type. As we argue above, REG is also negatively correlated with uncertainty and positively correlated with dependence.
We estimate the model both with and without a regulation variable. We also check whether the association between the factors (other than regulation) is driven by regulated industries by estimating the model excluding firms in regulated industries
Summary of expected empirical relations
We can summarize the empirical relations developed in sections three and four with the following equation.
DEC:= aO + alKT + a2~KT + a3DUNC + a4DEP +a SSIZE +a 6REG.
The model (1) Equation (1) forms the basis for our empirical work predicting the extent of decentralization.
We expect a4 and a6 to be negative. Increasing dependence increases control costs and leads to less decentralization. Regulation leads to transfer of knowledge upwards for regulatory purposes and thereby lowers the cost of centralization. We expect that a I, a2, a3 and as are non zero.
The signs of the coefficients on KT, ~KT and DUNC (a I, a2, and a3) depend on the relative effects of knowledge type on knowledge transfer costs and control costs. If, on average, the partial derivative of knowledge transfer costs with respect to knowledge type is greater than that of control costs, the three coefficients are positive. If the converse is true, all three coefficients are negative.
The theory does not necessarily imply a linear relation between decentralization and our explanatory variables. Our approach is to estimate the equation using linear least squares and to test for misspecifications including nonlinearities.
Descriptive Statistics
This section describes the data and the characteristics of the final sample and provides distributions for the measures used in the empirical work. Details underlying the questionnaire and selection ofthe sample are in appendix B.
The questionnaire provides evidence on the organization of the finn at the second level. It elicits data on profit and cost centers, dependence among the firm's of investments, and size of the finn. We end up with a usable sample of 121 firms. In relation to the set of COMPUSTAT firms, we obtain a representative size sample. But, utilities, financial and insurance companies are over
represented. An extended discussion of potential questionnaire response biases is in appendix B . Table 2 provides the distributions of the variables used for the 121 finn sample. More than half the firms (54%) report that their second level of management is organized into profit centers.
The rest of the firms' answers are roughly evenly distributed between organization into cost centers an organization into a mixture of profit and cost centers. The decentralization variable is coded as one for all profit centers, one half for mixed profit and cost centers and zero for all cost centers. LiKT is significantly positively correlated with SNLOB and SIZE, weakly positively correlated with DEC and DUNC, and significantly negatively correlated with KT.
The number of lines of business owned by our sample firms ranges from I to 38 with a mean of 8. So that all our variables and coefficients are approximately on the same scale, we divide NLOB by MAXLOB, the maximum NLOB in our sample of 38. This scaling also facilitates calculation of LiKT and has no effect on t statistics or their associated probabilities. It The distribution of answers to the dependence question in table 2 is 21% for unrelated businesses, 27% for related businesses, 23% for a dominant business and 29% for a single business. This distribution is similar to the distribution reported by Vancil (1978, p. 154) , which is 30%,28%,22% and 20% respectively. We have a few more firms in the single business category ar-' a few less in the unrelated category than Vancil. This is probably due to the over representation of utilities and banks in our sample. We create dummy variables (DEP2, DEP3 and DEP4) for the last three dependence categories, which are in order of increasing dependence.
As with SNLOB, the sales numbers obtained from COMPUSTAT are scaled by the maximum of the cross-sectional distribution of sales. The sales data indicate that our 121 finn sample consists of large firms. However, as noted above, the size of firms in the sample is insignificantly different from the size of COMPUSTAT firms that did not respond to the questionnaire. The mean size variable is 0.06 with a median of 0.02.
The sample includes 28 firms whose primary industry classification IS In the utility, communications, transportation or railroads industries, so the mean regulation variable in table 2 is 0.23 and the median is zero. Most regulated firms are utilities (24). Two firms are in the communications industry, one is a railroad and one is a trucking firm.
The means of the variables for the two-digit SIC code industries (using the Dun's Million Dollar Directory primary industries) are given in Table 3 Given the nature of the industries ranked as decentralized and centralized in table 3, it isn't surprising that the mean subjective knowledge type (KT) is significantly positively correlated (at the 0.01 level) with mean decentralization. In addition to mean DEC, mean KT is significantly correlated at least at the 0.10 level with mean dependence (QDEP) and mean SNLOB.
Dependence is measured in Table 3 
Empirical Relation Between Decentralization and Investment Characteristics
Theory provides no guidance about the functional form of the relation between decentralization and our explanatory variables. Therefore, we assume linear relations and test for denartures from this assumption.
The decentralization dependent variable in equation (1) The second diagnostic reported is a test for nonlinearities due to Christie (1989) . Third, the Belsley, Kuh and Welsh (1980) collinearity diagnostics are calculated for all regressions. As is evident from appendix C, our independent variables are collinear. But, there is no evidence that collinearity is degrading the estimators .
All R2's reported in the paper are adjusted for degrees of freedom. Reported probabilities of test statistics are for one tail tests when we predict the sign of an association and two tail otherwise. All significance levels of 0.000 I should be interpreted as less than or equal to 0.0001.
Given our reservations about exogeneity of the regulation variable, equation (l) is estimated both including and excluding the REG variable and for the unregulated firms only.
12 White also provides a variance/covariance matrix of the coefficient estimators that converges to the .ru variance/covariauce matrix in large samples, if the model is well specified. This allows calculation of test statistics that are unbiased, but inefficient, if the White test is detecting heteroscedasticity rather than misspecification. We discuss this further in section 6.3.
Empirical results
Column (1) When the two subjective knowledge type variables (KT and ~KT) are dropped from the regression (column 2), the coefficient on the remaining knowledge type variable (DUNC) increases (from 0.86 to 1.19) and so does the associated t statistic (from 3.00 to 3.96). The coefficients on the dependence dummies and the SIZE variable also become more significant. The coefficients on DEP2, DEP3 and DEP4 are significant at the 0.13, 0.013 and 0.0001 levels respectively and maintain their monotone relation. While the adjusted R2 drops to 0.35, the regression is still significant at the 0.0001 level. Even without the subjective knowledge type variables and the REG variable there is still a systematic relation between decentralization and investment set characteristics.
Column (3) reports the results of estimating equation ( If KT, ~KT and DUNC were measured without error, the significant coefficient on regulation indicates that regulation has marginal explanatory power for decentralization. However, it is likely that REG acts as a proxy for the underlying concepts we are trying to capture with these other variables.
It is therefore possible that REG has no marginal explanatory power, notwithstanding its significant negative coefficient. With the data available to us, we have no way to distinguish these possibilities.
To ensure that regulation is not driving the results, we estimate equation (I) using only the 93 firms in unregulated industries. The results are reported in column (5) and are similar to prior columns. All the included variables retain their signs and, except for DUNC, approximate significance levels. The t statistic on DUNC declines to 0.48. The regression is still significant at the 0.0001 level although the R2 declines to 0.24. This latter change is not surprising, since elimination of regulated firms removes a great deal of the cross-sectional variation from the sample. The regulated firms tend to produce relatively more non-specialized knowledge, be more dependent and have lower uncertainty.
To test whether the investment set characteristics add anything to the explanation of decentralization over and above knowledge of firms' industries, the regression in column (I) of QDEP and SIZE) is significant at the 0.004 probability level. The F statistic for the industry dummies is not significant at any reasonable probability level. Decentralization is associated with investment set characteristics when industry is controlled.
When the regression in table 5 is repeated with the two subjective knowledge type variables omitted, the significance levels for the coefficients of DUNC and QDEP become 0.07 and 0.001 respectively. The F statistic for the investment characteristics DUNC, QDEP and SIZE is significant at the 0.003 level. There is a systematic relation between the investment characteristics and decentralization even when the subjective knowledge type variables are excluded and industry is controlled. The F statistic for the investment dummies is significant at the 0.0005 level.
Overall the relation of decentralization with knowledge type, incremental knowledge type and dependence is robust. The relation between decentralization and uncertainty is sensitive to inclusion of the REG variable. However, the signs of the partial associations of decentralization with uncertainty and size are robust. While the various specifications estimated are not independent, the signs of the coefficients are always the same, consistent with our predictions and invariant to the particular model. Finally, even without the two subjective knowledge type variables there is a significant relation between investment set characteristics and decentralization.
These statements must be tempered by the knowledge that our regressions are potentially misspecified. Within the limits of the data, we discuss this further in later subsections.
Alternative measures of dependence
The dependence measure is the only explanatory variable obtained from the questionnaire.
For two reasons, we explore alternative dependence measures including one that is independent of the questionnaire. First, alternative measures provide evidence about the robustness of our results generally and to the way the question about dependence is asked in particular. The dependence question is intended to capture the existence of production and information externalities within the firm. Our concern is that the dependence question may do nothing more than ask the reverse of the i3 The results reported here are not sensitive to the lise of alternative dependence variables DEP4 and DEPLOB introduced in the next section.
decentralization question. That is, asking whether the finn has related or unrelated businesses might simply be the converse of asking whether it is decentralized (has profit or cost centers).
Second, developing a measure of dependence from publicly available sources moves us one step closer to eliminating reliance on the questionnaire and testing the theory on larger and more diverse data sets and in more time periods.
From table 6, the coefficient on DEP4 is approximately twice that on DEP3, four times that on DEP2 and the only one of the three that is consistently statistically significant. This suggests that dependence is most important when the finn considers itself a single business. Therefore, as a first step, we include DEP4 as the only dependence measure in the regression. Therefore, our dependence measure is one if the finn is a single business and is zero otherwise. This regression, which we report in column (I) of We next define a dependence measure that can be obtained from publicly available data. The results of using DEPLOB as the dependence measure are reported in column (2) of table 6. The coefficient on DEPLOB has a t statistic of -2.59. TIle results for the other coefficients are similar to column (I). All the coefficients have the same signs and approximately the same significance levels. For all practical purposes the specifications using DEP4 and DEPLOB are the same. We repeat both these specifications for just the unregulated firms and report them in columns (3) and (4). Once again the two variables produce results that are very similar to each other and to column (5) of table 6.
The analysis in table 6 is repeated using DEPLOB calculated at the three digit level (not reported). That is, DEPLOB3 is one if all the finn's SIC codes are within a single three digit group ar 1 zero otherwise. This variable has a lower correlation with DEP4 than does the corresponding two digit version (0.36 versus 0.46). Further, although DEPLOB3 has a negative sign when only unregulated firms are included, it is less significant than both DEP4 and DEPLOB. The coefficient on DEPLOB3 is not significantly different from zero when all firms are included. We attribute these differences to the fact that this stronger criterion for interdependence is more sensitive to our equal weighting of all the firm's SIC codes. That is, a firm could have operations in say two different three digit SIC codes within the same two digit classification, but one could be a relatively unimportant part of the firms operations. DEPLOB3 would classify such a firm as not dependent when in fact most of its operations are within the same three digit code and highly dependent.
Since firms' disclosures of segment data in annual reports bear no necessary relation to SIC codes, we have no way to weight firms' SIC codes and hence no way to test these conjectures.
We draw two conclusions from table 6. First, our results are robust to different ways of measuring dependence. Second, it is possible to derive a reasonable alternative measure of dependence from publicly available data, notwithstanding that measure equally weights all the firm's SIC codes.
Other specification tests
Misspecification . can arise from measurement error, correlated omitted variables, endogeneity of explanatory variables or from coefficients that vary across observations. All our variables are measured with error. SIZE and probably REG are endogenous. Once a firm chooses a line of business, the type of knowledge the firm generates, the types of uncertainties the firm faces and the degree of dependence of the firm's operating units are predetermined. That is, KT, DoKT, DUNC and DEP are predetermined when the decentralization decision is made.
The asymptotic chi-square statistic due to White (1980) provides a test of the joint hypothesis that a regression model is well specified and homoscedastic. Despite the measurement error and potential endogeneity of some of our explanatory variables, we can reject this joint hypothesis at the 10% level only for those regressions that exclude the two subjective knowledge type variables (columns 2 and 4 of table 4).
Even for the models that are well specified and homoscedastic, it is useful to compare the OLS variance/covariance matrix of the coefficient estimators with the corresponding asymptotic matrix on which the White test is based. The diagonals of the asymptotic variancelcovariance matrix are very close to those in the OLS equivalent in all regressions including the two that are misspecified. To the extent that there are small differences between the diagonals, the OLS standard errors tend to be larger than the White asymptotic standard errors. We report all probability levels based on the larger OLS standard errors.
The similarity of the matrices suggests there is no heteroscedasticity in any of the .eg.cssions. This is interesting in light of our use of OLS with a discrete dependent variable and consistent with the simulations of Noreen (1988) and Stone and Rasp (1991) . The minor differences between the two matrices are mainly associated with SIZE or variables correlated with SIZE.
The foregoing analysis suggests that further robustness checks with alternative ways to measure SIZE are warranted. We repeat the regressions with a variety of different size measures.
These include continuous and categorical variations of sales and number of employees, total assets and SNLOB. From appendix C, it is seen that SNLOB is more highly correlated with all the other variables than is our size variable. SNLOB has a correlation with KT of 0.52, with ~KT of 0.38 and with DUNC of 0.21. Including SNLOB in the regressions both provides an alternative size measure and checks that our KT, ~KT and DUNC variables are not just acting as proxies for SNLOB.
When we add SNLOB to the models in columns (3) and (5) The weak results we find for size may be due to the nature of our sample. There is considerable size variation in the sample. However, as we discuss in section 4.2, this variation may not be sufficient if there is a "threshold" effect with size. If size per se leads to decentralization of decision rights only after the firm reaches a given size, and if most of our finns are larger than this threshold, one would not be surprised that we find a weak association between decentralization and size. This also suggests that a dummy variable related to the threshold would be a better size measure than the continuous and categorical variables we use. It is also possible that both knowledge transfer costs and control costs increase with size in such a way that size has little effect on the organization structure. We cannot test these conjectures with our current data.
We also check whether the results are sensitive to measurement of the DUNC variable. All the reported results are repeated with the adjustment for the intra-finn correlation structure calculated at the three-digit level rather than the two-digit level we report. DUNC is also estimated assuming the finn's lines of business are independent and with no adjustment at all. That is, we also use UNC instead ofDUNC. None ofthe results changes in a substantive way.
The results we report in table 4 are robust. None of the alternative specifications we test leads to results that are substantively different from those reported. In particular, there is no evidence that any of our variables are acting as proxies for something like the number of lines of bu less. Note from columns (1) and (5) in table 4 that, except for DUNC, the slope coefficients are not sensitive to excluding the regulated firms.
Our REG variable covers utilities, transportation and communications firms. Since financial and insurance firms are also subject to various forms of regulation we rerun the analyses in table 4 including a dummy variable that one is for financial and insurance firms and zero otherwise. This dummy has a t statistic of about -1.0, but has little effect on the other coefficients and t statistics
7.
Application of the Model to Caterpillar.
To find an in-sample corporation whose decentralization has been assessed in the media, we searched the Wall Street Journal using the Dow Jones NewslRetrieval service for the period 1990
1993 for references to two firms, General Electric and Caterpillar. One of our executive professor colleagues had 'a priori' assessed General Electric as decentralized and Caterpillar as centralized.
Using the words "centralized", "decentralized", and "structure", we found references only to . This led to an emphasis on profit centers: "To achieve a 'flatter' and more flexible structure, Caterpillar is replacing its function-oriented hierarchy with highly autonomous profit centers and support divisions".
In responding to our 1988 questionnaire, Caterpillar management describe the firm as using both profit and cost-centers, so its decentralization was scored as 0.5 (mixed). The predicted dependent variable for Caterpillar using the estimated equation in column (2) of table 6 is 0.71. The Caterpillar case suggests that the model is working as implied in the more aggregate results, but it requires more exploration (e.g., the reasons for the addition of the new industries).
Further, additional cases may provide further intuition and insight. On that point, we note that the expected decentralization for General Electric in both 1987 and 1992 using the model in column (2) of table 4 is 0.89. GE's management reported in the 1988 questionnaire that all the units at the second level are organized as profit centers so GE's decentralization variable is scored as 1.0.
8.
Summary And Conclusions
We expand on the analysis and evidence in Jensen and Meckling (1992) , Chandler (1962 and 1977) , Vancil (1978) and Williamson (1975) to provide evidence that decentralization of the firm is robustly related to characteristics of the firm's investment opportunity set. Those characteristics are the type of knowledge generated in the firm's industry, the dependence of the firm's investments, firm size and regulation. Evidence on the association between decentralization and these variables is generated using a questionnaire and data from public sources.
The evidence is consistent with the expected associations. The empirical associations are generally significant and always have the same signs across different specifications. We predict the signs of two variables' associations with decentralization (dependence and regulation). The sign of the association of decentralization with the other variables depends on the relative effects of these variables on knowledge transfer costs and control costs. However, the coefficients on the three variables that measure knowledge type should have the same sign. The evidence is consistent with all these predictions.
The evidence is consistent with knowledge transfer costs being, on average, relatively more important than control costs in the decentralization decision. More decentralized firms tend to generate more specialized knowledge, have lower dependencies among the firms' investments and have greater uncertainty about the firms' returns. They are also tend to be larger and unregulated.
The evidence not only supports the predicted associations between decentralization and other variables, but also it is robust. There is no evidence of nonlinearity with respect to the continuous independent variables and the coefficients are robust to excluding some of the firms and to different wt .; of measuring variables. Except for the models that exclude the two subjective knowledge type variables, we cannot reject the hypothesis that our models are well specified and 27
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An important caveat that indicates the nature of the endogeneity has to do with the acquisition of knowledge. We argue that the allocation of decision rights depends on the type of knowledge generated by the firm. However, allocating decision rights to someone might change the nature of the knowledge they acquire. In particular, they might acquire more or different knowledge from that acquired in the absence of the decision rights. Further, as noted in the Caterpillar case, decentralization of decision rights can change the degree of dependence of the firms' investments. While we speculate that these are second order effects, we have no way of testing this. 14 Two of our three measures of knowledge type depend on a subjective classification. While subjective, it is made a priori and we believe it reflects Jensen and Meckling's notions of specialized, assembled and non-specialized knowledge. Further, a robust relation exists between decentralization and the other investment set characteristics when the two variables are dropped.
The data obtained from our questionnaire enable us to investigate other theory of the firm issues in future papers. In particular, we plan to draw on the analysis in this paper and other data in the questionnaire and investigate variation across firms in methods used for transfer pricing, budgeting, and performance measurement and evaluation. Variation in the use of accounting numbers in these processes is an integral part of the future work. "line unit" means exciusiveiv a line level directlv reporting to the CEO. TIle name of that level will vary with its function in the organizational structure and with linn size (e.g., it may be a group, a division or a department). TIle line unit mayor may not be a separate legal entity (subsidiary).
A "line manager" is the person responsible for a line unit. The expression "CEO" includes the CEO himself, and any member of CEO's office or corporate staff Now please answer each of the following questions. If you want to make some additional comments, please do so at the end of the
questionnaire. Indicate the number of the question that your remark or comment addresses.
I. Is a line manager allowed to substitute one line item of the budget for another on his own initiative? The questionnaire is designed to provide evidence on the organization of the firm at the second level. We elicit whether the firm has profit or cost centers, and measure dependency of investments, firm size, the use of transfer pricing methods, the use of budgets and the firm's accounting-based compensation and promotion mechanisms. The answers to questions about size variables are compared to the same variables as listed on COMPUSTAT for verification.
The questionnaire is provided in Appendix A. To increase the response rate the questionnaire is kept to three pages and does not contain questions about financial data other than sales. Questions on financial data are expected to reduce the response rate for small firms.
A first draft of the questionnaire was reviewed with a psychology faculty member experienced in questionnaires to reduce the likelihood managers would misunderstand the questions. A revised draft was completed by two middle level managers in the Simon School's executive development program. After interviewing those managers, some small changes were made in the formulation of the questions and the questionnaire was mailed to the Vice-President
Finance in 97 representative companies in our sample, The questionnaire was sent with a cover letter stating that on request the respondent would be provided with the aggregate results from the survey and the original copy of their completed questionnaire. Only trivial changes were made as a consequence of the 97 firm mailing (no questions were changed) and the questionnaire was sent to the remaining 1998 sample firms in early June 1988.
B2. Sample Selection
The sample of firms is obtained from the 1987 edition of Ward's Business Directory (Ward's) Volumes I and 2. That edition is based on annual reports and IO-K filings for 1985 data.
A total of 2095 firms is drawn from Ward's. The sample is not random, but instead is selected to provide a range of firm sizes and industries. The 750 largest publicly-held industrial companies, the largest 525 privately-held industrial companies, the 110 largest commercial banks and the 110 largest insurance companies are drawn from Ward's Volume I which contains data on 43,134
firms. The 600 small industrial firms are drawn from Volume 2, which contains data on 39,651 firms with annual sales between $0.5 million and $11 million. The 600 firms are drawn from a list of firms with $10 million in sales. They are the largest 600 firms (based on number of ~!T .oyees) on that list. The questionnaire was sent to all 2095 firms. Thirty-nine of the questionnaires were not delivered, primarily because the firms had gone out of business.
The initial sample is spread across a range of firm sizes and industries because the sample will also be used in other studies, some of which require data on small and privately-held firms and Appendix B (continued) non-industrial firms. In this study, our measure of uncertainty requires that the firms be publicly traded and so we only use finns from the publicly-held industrial firm, commercial bank and insurance company categories.
In total 297 responses are received (14.4%). CUSIP numbers could be identified for only 126 of those responses and five of the 126 responses did not have all questions answered. That left a sample of 121 firms for analysis.
B3. Response
Relative to other empirical studies in this area, the response rate (14.4%) is low. Vancil (1978) , Cress and Pettijohn (1985) and Daley, Jiambalvo, Sundem and Kondo (1985) report response rates of35.3%, 27.4% and 39.7% respectively. One likely reason for our lower response rate is that while the previous studies survey large publicly-held companies, approximately 50% of our sample are small businesses or privately-held companies. Our response rate among the largest publicly-held companies (17.4%) is higher than the overall response rate, but still less than the previous studies' response rates. A second likely reason for the lower response rate is the sensitive nature of some of the questions asked (for example, the ratio of cash bonus compensation to salary -see question 3 appendix A). The confidentiality problem is also suggested by the fact that 37 firms returned their questionnaires without identifying themselves. Three of these firms could be identified from the postmarks and other characteristics.
The prime response bias appears to be with respect to size. The median number of employees for all the firms in the respondent sample for which the number is available in Ward's (234 firms) is 5,000. The equivalent number for the nonrespondent sample (1636 firms) is 2,700.
The median and Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney tests (see Siegel and Castell an, 1988, sections 5.3 and 5 .4) for differences in the median and distribution of employee numbers respectively between the respondent and nonrespondent samples are both significant at the 0.00 I level. However, there is little response bias due to size among the COMPUSTAT firms surveyed. There are 623
COMPUSTAT firms included in the sample and 126 (20%) of those firms responded. There is little difference in size between the responding and non-responding COMPUSTAT firms. Neither the median nor the Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney tests allow rejection of the null hypothesis of no difference in size or number of employees at any reasonable probability level.
The distribution of firms across industries differs significantly between the respondent sample and the nonrespondent sample. The chi-square statistic for testing the null of no difference is significant at the 0.00 I level. Utilities and financial and insurance companies are over rei .sented in the respondent sample and the other industries are under represented. These differences at least partially reflect size differences. Utilities are even more over represented in the subsample investigated in this version of the paper and financial and insurance companies are under represented rather than over represented. 
